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BOOK REVIEWS
The Mighty and the Almighty, by Nicholas Wolterstorff. Cambridge, UK, and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 181 pages. $81.00 hardcover.
LUKE MARING, Northern Arizona University
In The Mighty and the Almighty, Nicholas Wolterstorff aims to: (i) disprove 
the view, common in political theology, that disobedience to the state 
necessarily constitutes disrespect to God; (ii) sketch a novel, yet recogniz-
ably Pauline, account of the limits of state authority; and (iii) undermine 
perfectionist accounts of the state, again common in political theology, by 
showing that a Pauline account of government resonates with contempo-
rary liberalism.
Let us begin with (i). Why would disobedience to the state constitute 
disrespect to God? The argument traces back to the apostle Paul, who fa-
mously wrote that God gave authority to all governments. This seems to 
imply that by disobeying the state, one rejects God’s appointee—saying, 
in effect, that God was wrong to put her in charge.
Wolterstorff argues that traditional political theologies—including, 
notably, John Calvin’s—are guilty of a conceptual confusion. Positional 
authority, for Wolterstorff, amounts to holding office in an institution that 
is widely regarded as authoritative—by dint of her membership in the 
police force, an officer has positional authority. Performance authority, by 
contrast, is the authorization to do some particular thing—to write speed-
ing tickets, for example. Now, legislators in a government have positional 
authority; but it does not follow that they have the performance authority 
to write immoral laws.
Turn to (ii): Wolterstorff denies that governments have the performance 
authority to write immoral laws. What is his positive account? What, ex-
actly, does God authorize governments to do? According to Wolterstorff, 
Paul thinks that governments are primarily in the business of curbing 
wrongdoing. To develop Paul’s view, Wolterstorff borrows Dutch theolo-
gian Abraham Kuyper’s concept of spheres. Different human enterprises 
inhabit different spheres or sectors—science, art, religion, and family, and 
so on. Within each sphere, different authority structures hold sway. In 
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the sphere of science, universities are an authoritative structure; within 
religion, churches are in charge; and so on. These spheres should, accord-
ing to Wolterstorff, exist alongside one another without encroaching into 
each other’s domain. So it is presumably wrong for the Christian church 
to insist that creationism be taught alongside evolution in science classes, 
just as it is wrong for non-religious groups to force Sikhs and Muslims to 
abandon religious apparel. Unfortunately, institutions routinely overstep 
their boundaries. Enter the state: states are to curb wrongdoing by punish-
ing institutions that try to commandeer neighboring spheres. The state’s 
second main task is similar: to curb, via punishment, the wrongdoing of 
individuals.
We can now see why Wolterstorff denies that citizens must choose be-
tween disobeying the state and disrespecting God. A government that in-
stitutes immoral laws oversteps its performance authority. God authorizes 
the state to curb wrongdoing, not to become the agent of wrongdoing itself.
One semantic quibble: Current political philosophy distinguishes be-
tween authority and legitimacy. Authority is the normative power to give 
someone a moral reason to ϕ by writing a law that tells her to ϕ; legitimacy 
is the permission to use one’s authority and to enforce laws. Possessing 
a normative power is one thing; the permission to use and enforce it is 
something else. Thus, the activity of curbing wrongdoing—Wolterstorff’s 
performance authority—falls under the heading of legitimacy. The upshot 
of this semantic quibble is that it isn’t altogether clear which side of the 
contemporary debate Wolterstorff is on. Whereas statists believe that we 
are bound to obey the law because governments are authoritative, philo-
sophical anarchists hold that if we have moral reasons to obey the law, it is 
because the law tells us to do what we already had authority-independent 
moral reasons to do (e.g., the state commands us not to murder). If the state 
is merely authorized to curb wrongdoing, and not also authorized to write 
laws that make actions count as wrongdoing in the first place, Wolterstorff 
is not a statist.1
Now turn to (iii). Political theologies are typically perfectionist, hold-
ing that the state’s job is to make citizens and society morally excellent—a 
task that goes far beyond the protection of basic rights. It is not hard to see 
why political theologies have a perfectionist bent: they are committed to 
a (fairly) comprehensive account of the good, and they see governments 
as one of God’s tools for realizing it. Wolterstorff goes against the grain, 
and argues that his Pauline view of the state resonates with contemporary 
liberal democracy.
At first glance, this may seem implausible: the job of a liberal de-
mocracy is to protect a relatively small number of basic rights, whereas 
1Many thanks to Terence Cuneo for pointing out to me that Wolterstorff commits to stat-
ism; see Nicholas Wolterstorff, Understanding Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012). However, I still find it odd that a book dedicated, in part, to outlining the gov-
ernment’s proper role doesn’t come down on either side of the statist/philosophical anarchist 
debate.
BOOK REVIEWS 231
Wolterstorff’s Pauline view assigns government the task of curbing wrong-
doing in general. We do wrong when jealousy makes us miserly with our 
praise; but liberalism’s list of basic rights does not traditionally include a 
right to be praised. Or again, we do wrong when cruelty leads us to mock 
our peers; liberalism objects only if our jests manage to deprive people of 
their basic rights. Yet Wolterstorff’s argument proceeds:
To wrong someone is to deprive her of something to which she has a right, 
a legitimate claim. And to deprive her of something to which she has a right 
or legitimate claim is to treat her unjustly. So instead of saying that it is 
the God-assigned task of government to curb wrongdoing, we could say 
that it is the God-assigned task of government to curb injustice. . . . [In other 
words,] God has assigned government the task of being a rights-protecting 
institution.2
Since the raison d’être of liberal democracy is to protect rights, Wolterstorff 
concludes, “we get an argument for a state that is limited in exactly the 
sort of way that our liberal democracies are limited.”3
Now, in the first sentence Wolterstorff claims that every instance of 
wrongdoing violates a right. He defends this claim at length in a different 
book.4 But whether or not his defense succeeds, it’s certainly not true that 
every wrongdoing violates one of the basic rights that liberalism tradition-
ally protects. In assigning governments the task of curbing wrongdoing 
in general, Wolterstorff’s Pauline view threatens to authorize far too much 
state intervention to qualify as liberal.
Wolterstorff does emphasize, on several occasions, that the state should 
not curb wrongdoing if the moral cost of doing so would be worse than 
the original wrongdoing. This is a sound principle, which may be traced 
back to at least John Stuart Mill. Can we use it to close the gap between 
Wolterstorff’s view and liberalism? Perhaps, but doing so wouldn’t show 
that there is any natural affinity between the two. On the assumption that 
governments do more harm than good by trying to curb wrongdoing that 
is unrelated to basic rights, even the most overtly perfectionist view, when 
combined with Mill’s principle, will result in a liberal government. Mill’s 
principle can liberalize any political philosophy. So the fact that Wolter-
storff plus Mill equals liberalism is no reason to think that Wolterstorff’s 
view is particularly liberal.5
2Nicholas Wolterstorff, The Mighty and the Almighty (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 90.
3Ibid., 150.
4Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2008). More thanks are due to Terence Cuneo for pointing this out to me, and for help-
ful comments on a draft of this review.
5That might not be a bad thing. Feminists, critical race theorists, and critical gender theo-
rists have all pointed out that our history of discrimination has concentrated wealth, power, 
and privilege disproportionately in the hands of whites and of men. With its emphasis on 
basic (and mostly negative) rights—they continue—liberalism ends up preserving an un-
just status quo. The public-private distinction, to take just one example, has meant that the 
government does not protect women’s rights where they are often most imperiled: at home. 
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I will close with a meta-concern.6 The pluralistic, many-spheres struc-
ture of Wolterstorff’s account implies that the Bible is not authoritative in 
politics; yet Wolterstorff develops his political philosophy by consulting 
the writings of the apostle Paul. The problem here is not that religious 
resources are inadmissible in politics. Wolterstorff describes the state as 
the “sphere of spheres,” as a sphere that encompasses all the others.7 So 
religious resources are admissible because resources from all human en-
terprises are admissible. We should design our government using the best 
of the business world, the best from religion, and so on. The problem is 
rather that anyone—Christian or otherwise—who believes Wolterstorff’s 
view must also believe that principles from the Bible are not privileged 
in the sphere of spheres. We can consult the Bible, but only in the way 
that we would consult canonical economic texts, A Theory of Justice, Das 
Capital, journals of social science, or anything else. So no one—Christian 
or otherwise—who believes Wolterstorff’s political philosophy should 
believe it simply because it is the best interpretation of Paul. Wolterstorff 
therefore has to defend his view on its merits, which is a task The Mighty 
and the Almighty leaves undone. I mean this as a call for more work, not as 
knockdown criticism—there is no a priori reason why views inspired by 
the Bible cannot be defended on their merits.™
The Mighty and the Almighty is a worthwhile read. Wolterstorff’s Pauline 
account of the state is interesting in its own right—not least because it ex-
plains why institutions, as well as individuals, can be right-holders. This 
is a significant departure from the individualism of most western politi-
cal philosophy, and it is a plausible one. Interesting philosophical projects 
raise new questions as they solve old problems; we should look forward 
to reading Wolterstorff’s answers.
Because he thinks the state is supposed to curb wrongdoing in general, Wolterstorff’s politi-
cal theology may, depending upon which rights he emphasizes, support a view that is more 
progressive than liberalism.
6I am indebted, here, to a conversation with Russ Pryba.
7Ibid., 166.
The Purpose of Life: A Theistic Perspective, by Stewart Goetz. London and 
New York: Continuum, 2012. 189 pages. $24.00 paper.
JOSHUA SEACHRIS, University of Notre Dame
In The Purpose of Life: A Theistic Perspective, Stewart Goetz contributes to 
the expanding discussion within analytic philosophy on life’s meaning. 
Regrettably, for the better part of the last century analytic philosophers 
